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This paper draws on recent empirical evidence to look at how human capital policies in 
New Zealand can achieve “Inclusive Economy” objectives.  In particular it looks at 
evidence on policies that are best to promote growth, and to improve the distribution of 
well-being; whether they are the same, and the extent to which they involve trade-offs.   
 
Compared to other OECD countries, New Zealand appears to have relatively high rates 
of participation in tertiary education, and at least average performance on measures of 
achievement amongst school students.  Nevertheless, in common with other English 
speaking countries, it tends to have a relatively wide dispersion of skills both amongst 
school students and in the working age population.  There is some suggestion that 
New Zealand is not making as much progress as other countries (Australia in 
particular) in raising skills among the less able, in new generations of school leavers. 
 
Taken over all, the paper suggests a two-pronged strategy.  Firstly, policies should aim 
to increase the incidence of world-class tertiary education and research relevant to 
industry.  Given already high levels of public and private investment in tertiary 
education, this should involve redesign of institutional and funding arrangements, 
rather than large amounts of extra public resources.   Secondly, policies should aim to 
raise the skills of the less able entering the workforce.  Interventions in early childhood 
and primary schooling are likely to be most effective in the long term – though, given 
the current large stock of low skilled adults, a continuing search for effective working-
age interventions to address this will also be worthwhile. 
 
JEL classification:  H5 National government expenditures and related policies, I2 Education, 
J3 Wages, compensation, and labour costs 
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SUMMARY 
Purpose 
This report looks at how human capital policies can help achieve “Inclusive Economy” 
objectives.  In particular, it looks at evidence on the following questions: 
 
•  What sort of human capital policies would be best for New Zealand to pursue to 
raise economic growth?   
•  What human capital policies should it use to improve the distribution of well-
being? 
•  Are these policies the same?  In what way do they differ?  To what extent is there 
a trade-off in pursuing these objectives.  For example, do they involve competing 
demands on scarce resources? 
Human capital is linked with earnings, economic growth and well-being 
“Human Capital” has been defined as “acquired human capabilities, which are durable 
traits, yielding some positive effects upon performance in socially valued activities”1.  It 
has many dimensions, and is acquired through a range of processes, in a variety of 
settings (family, school, firms and the community). 
 
A wide range of policies may be used to influence its accumulation – though typically 
most governments in developed countries substantially rely on direct provision, and, 
more widely, the funding of formal education at all levels.  Second order policies 
include support for families in undertaking the task of raising children, non-tertiary 
labour market training, adult literacy programmes and certification and subsidy of 
training provided or purchased by employers. 
 
Over the last 40 years, the human capital literature has established a strong and 
consistent association between years of education, qualifications and higher earnings.  
Though less certain, and less robust, an association between human capital and 
economic growth has also been established.  
 
In addition, education is positively associated with a range of other individual and 
societal goods –  for instance, healthier life-styles, lower propensity to commit crime, 
higher levels of trust, richer social networks, and greater participation in volunteering 
and in democratic institutions.  Moreover, higher levels of human capital in one 
generation of families and communities are strongly associated with higher levels in the 
next.  
 
The literature has not reached consensus as to how much these associations 
represent causal effects,  and how far they represent other causal factors correlated 
with human capital. There is uncertainty, too, about the extent to which the 
associations represent “reverse causality” – for instance, countries which grow faster or 
have higher output per capita, spend more on education.  There is also a question 
about how far the effects on growth found for a larger sample of countries apply to 
OECD countries – where it is possible that there are diminishing marginal returns to 
additional average years of education.  Moreover, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
relationship between education and individual earnings may be due not only to the 
                                                
1 David (2001).  Because the weight of empirical evidence uses education as a proxy for human capital, 
the discussion in this paper is often focused on education, rather than the broader range of skills and 
capabilities encompassed by the term “human capital”. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  4 
skills and capabilities imparted by education, but also to educational qualifications 
being used to “signal” innate ability to employers. 
 
Nevertheless, recent empirical studies using better data and methodologies support a 
growing consensus (see Temple, 2000) that, even for OECD countries, there is a 
causal relationship between average years of education and the long-run level of 
output per worker.  There is also evidence that, in many OECD countries, there has 
been a long term rise in the earnings premia accruing to well-educated workers, 
despite increasing supply of such workers.  In a number of countries, this has been 
associated with a widening dispersion of earnings, particularly over the last 20 years.  
Likewise, labour economists tend to accept that the association between education and 
earnings represents real productivity effects, with true annual returns to an extra year 
of education being in the order of 5–15%. 
 
Human capital is a complement to technological progress 
Economists generally conceive long-run growth in output per worker as being due to 
technological progress.  Some economists place particular emphasis on the process of 
technology creation and adoption as the driver of economic growth.  They emphasise 
the role of  experts engaged in industry research and development – though, obviously 
entrepreneurs and managers capable of adapting organisations to take advantage of 
technological innovation are also important.  Other economists emphasise the 
importance of a skilled workforce, capable of utilising new “skill-biased” technologies in 
the workplace.  Some, indeed, argue that the availability of such workers induces the 
creation and adoption of new technologies. 
 
Rapid “skill-biased” technological progress may partly explain a widening dispersion of 
earnings 
Many economists believe that skill-biased technological progress is also the main 
cause of increasing skill premia, and a widening dispersion of earnings in many OECD 
countries, particularly over the last 30 years.  Analysis suggests that, even with an 
increasing supply of tertiary educated workers, skill premia are not likely to reduce 




•  High rates of economic growth are likely to require a mix of highly skilled 
technical specialists, skilled entrepreneurs and managers capable of seeing and 
putting in place new opportunities for productivity gains, and workers with good, 
medium-level skills to operate new “skill-biased” technologies. 
•  The most effective human capital policies to reduce dispersion and improve 
adequacy of earnings are likely to be those that increase the skills of those in the 
bottom part of the skills distribution.  There is also reason to believe that raising 
human capital in the bottom of the distribution (as opposed to elsewhere) will 
have particular benefits for other aspects of individual well-being and a well 
functioning society.  
 
New Zealand has high rates of participation in tertiary education… 
By OECD standards, New Zealand has high rates of enrolment in tertiary education, 
high graduation rates and also high participation in other forms of adult education and 
training.  As graduates enter the workforce, replacing less educated workers, New 
Zealand should be able to maintain or even increase its ranking in terms of average HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  5 
years of education in the working age population2.  Its best graduates are able to enter 
top universities around the world, and some have successful top ranking careers 
overseas. 
 
Nevertheless, two areas stand out for further policy development and action.  One, 
improving the quality of selected parts of tertiary education to world-class, is primarily 
relevant to raising economic growth.  The other, raising skills among the less able, 
while making its main contribution through improving the distribution of well-being, will 
also raise employment and productivity.   
 
New Zealand has been remarkably successful in rapidly increasing the output of 
tertiary graduates over the last 15 years, while keeping real government outlays tightly 
constrained.  This has been achieved through bulk funding tertiary institutions on the 
basis of student numbers, with students expected to contribute a part of tuition costs 
(able to be financed through student loans).  This bulk funding includes an element to 
cover research – but does not provide strong incentives for excellence in research.  
Quality assurance systems are designed to ensure tertiary providers exceed minimum 
standards.  The main mechanism to make provision responsive to the needs of the 
economy is student demand for courses, which in turn is presumed to be impacted by 
differences in labour market returns to educational investments. 
 
… but there is room to increase the number of world-class centres of research and 
teaching 
However, New Zealand is a small, remote, open economy which operates in an 
international labour market for the most skilled workers.  It is competing with a number 
of higher-income countries for the best academic workers.  It is very unlikely that 
policies that aim at a uniform standard across the tertiary system, will reliably produce 
world class centres of research and teaching.  No country has the resources to afford a 
uniformly world class standard of provision in its universities.  
 
While some recognised centres of excellence do exist, it is possible that a careful 
choice of funding and institutional arrangements could lead to the emergence of more, 
in areas of particular relevance to New Zealand’s economic growth.  Encouraging 
selected areas of world-class provision requires internationally competitive salaries.   
Building on emerging centres of excellence, particularly where they can demonstrate 
effective linkages with relevant industries, could reduce the risk of wasted resources.  
Internationally, it is not uncommon for research centres (often associated with 
teaching) to be funded through a tendering process that provides sufficient continuity to 
allow strategic investments to be made, but that also provides strong incentives for 
performance. 
 
New Zealand can support only a limited number of such centres.  However, they could 
play a significant role in the identification and adoption (and, in some areas, the 
creation) of relevant technologies by attracting and retaining top staff and students, and 
building linkages with industry and overseas centres, across which knowledge can be 
transferred.  The particular design of institutions and funding policies are likely to be 
important for giving industry, students and tertiary managers the confidence to make 
the investments that will yield productivity gains in the longer term.  A degree of 
experimentation may be required to find the best arrangements. 
 
                                                
2 Compared to many OECD countries, New Zealand has a relatively young population.  As better 
educated younger cohorts replace older cohorts of workers, New Zealand is well placed to improve relative 
overall levels of education in its workforce. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  6 
New Zealand has a comparatively wide dispersion of achievement … 
On a range of measures of achievement and skills across countries, New Zealand, 
together with other English speaking nations, appears to have a relatively wide 
dispersion of scores.  In reading literacy our average scores for school children rank 
amongst the best in the world, but we do relatively worse for the bottom 25%.  New 
Zealand ranks in the top three countries for mathematics for the top 25% of young 
people at the age of final year of schooling; but earlier in the school system our 
rankings on average scores are middling.  A relatively high proportion (perhaps 20%) of 
our students leave school at age 16 and do not participate in further formal education 
and training.   
 
…and may be falling further behind in skills at the bottom 
Amongst countries participating in the International Adult Literacy Study, we rank 
among the bottom half in mean scores on two of the three scales.  Moreover, the 
proportion of the youngest cohort (16 – 25 year olds) with the lowest level of literacy 
shows little improvement on older cohorts, unlike many other countries participating.  It 
is particularly striking that we appear to be falling well behind Australia in this respect, 
and in participation of young people in formal education through the ages 16 to 18. 
 
Improving the skills of school-leavers will be most cost-effective in the long term 
Addressing this pattern of poor skills requires a two-pronged strategy – one to reduce 
the numbers of young people leaving formal education without adequate skills to 
secure stable employment, and the other to improve skills for those already in the 
workforce.  Because of the cumulative nature of educational investments, early 
interventions in pre-school and primary education are likely to be most cost effective in 
the long run.  Of particular importance are foundation skills in literacy and numeracy, 
which provide the platform for later learning both in school and the workforce.  Though 
many other skills are also relevant, such skills have been shown to have a strong link 
with labour market success independent of levels of education.  Many other 
jurisdictions, for instance the United Kingdom, are placing strong emphasis on 
initiatives that lead to measurable improvements in foundation skills. 
 
Importantly, there are interventions that have been shown to be effective in raising 
these skills amongst disadvantaged children, and progress is relatively easily 
monitored, helping in the selection and refinement of such interventions.  By and large 
they need to find ways to engage families and communities in partnerships with 
schools in pursuit of learning objectives.  The Strengthening Education in Mangere and 
Otara (SEMO) project is a promising New Zealand initiative of this type.   
 
Increasing skills in the bottom part of the distribution in the current working age 
population is desirable – but evidence on effective policies is sparse 
Addressing low levels of human capital in the adult population raises different issues.  
First there is no strong evidence that second chance education is particularly effective 
in securing better labour market and earnings outcomes.  In the short to medium term, 
evidence supports concentrating on getting persistently unemployed persons into work 
as a first priority.  However, policies to increase human capital may have other benefits, 
and may be as effective in improving labour market outcomes – though not as cost-
effective as “work first” policies – over the longer term.  Focusing on employment, with 
supported work-based training, may be an effective alternative. 
 
Overall, there is a need to gain a better understanding of what policies are effective in 
which circumstances and for whom.  This can only be achieved through 
experimentation and good evaluation of policies as they are implemented in New HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  7 
Zealand, and drawing on learning from other jurisdictions.  It also requires a better 
understanding of the characteristics of people who have persistent difficulties in 
securing stable employment.   
 
Improving tertiary education for technological progress should not require large 
amounts of additional government resources 
Policies aiming to increase the incidence of world-class tertiary education and research 
relevant to industry do not require large additions to existing publicly provided 
resources.    This will involve only a small proportion of all tertiary provision, and high 
private rates of return provide strong incentives for individual students to contribute 
their own resources (assisted by the student loan scheme).  More selective funding, 
coupled with suitable institutional arrangements could lead to significant 
improvements3. 
 
Worthwhile progress in raising skills at the bottom of the skills distribution may require 
significant additional government resources 
On the other hand, determined efforts to reduce the incidence of low skills among new 
entrants to the working age population are likely to require significant additional 
resources – but again careful work is required to identify the most cost-effective 
policies.  Much less is known about the capacity to raise basic skills in the adult 
population – suggesting a cautious approach, with expansion dependent on successful 
evaluation.  Recent work in the United Kingdom (Bynner et al., 2001) suggests that if 
successful in raising skills, such initiatives could have substantial benefits not only for 
the individuals concerned, but also for social outcomes, productivity, economic growth 
and fiscally. 
                                                
3 Data supplied by the Ministry of Education and OECD data (OECD 2000a, Table B4) for 1997 suggest 
that New Zealand’s ratio of per student public expenditure in tertiary education, to that in primary (or 
secondary) is already comparatively high among OECD countries.  HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  8 
INTRODUCTION* 
An inclusive economy can be seen as having three main, interlinked components: 
social capability, productive capability and well-being.  The key objective in an inclusive 
economy is to improve people’s well-being.  The concept draws on the links between a 
productive and innovative economy and a strong, cohesive society, and how each of 
these contributes to well-being.  It directs policy at ensuring broad-based opportunities 
to participate in society and the economy as the key route to improved well-being. 
 
The overall objective in the inclusive economy is the well-being of New Zealanders.  
Well-being derives not only from average material living standards but also the 
distribution of income and a range of social characteristics such as values, trust, 
participation, cohesion and people’s freedom to do the things that they have reason to 
value.  
 
A strong association between human capital and well-being has been established … 
The relationship between “human capital”4, individual well-being and the characteristics 
of a well functioning society are widely recognised.  Over the last 40 years the human 
capital literature has established a strong and consistent association between years of 
education, qualifications and higher earnings.  Though less certain, and less robust, an 
association between human capital and economic growth has also been established.   
 
In addition, education is positively associated with a range of other individual and 
societal goods – for instance, healthier life-styles, lower propensity to commit crime, 
higher levels of trust, richer social networks and greater participation in volunteering 
and in democratic institutions.  Moreover, higher levels of human capital in one 
generation of families and communities are strongly associated with higher levels in the 
next. 
 
Thus, governments of all complexions and in most countries in the developed and 
developing world have put major effort into achieving increased levels of human 
capital, primarily through the funding and provision of formal education.   
 
… but many policy questions remain 
Nevertheless, important questions remain for policy, even in the broadest context.  
 
•  Will human capital policies5 chosen to be best for increasing economic growth 
(narrowly measured) also be best for improving the overall level and distribution 
of well-being?  If not, in what way do they differ?  How much will policies aimed 
primarily at improving the distribution of well-being also increase growth?   
Further, to what extent do alternative objectives compete for government funding, 
and, if so, how much will one need to be traded for the other, in deciding on the 
allocation of funding? 
                                                
∗   This paper was prepared for The Treasury by Ron Crawford, The Treasury, P.O. Box 3724, Wellington, 
New Zealand, http://www.treasury.govt.nz.  The author acknowledges the assistance of officials in 
Treasury and other government departments, and of academics and other colleagues who have 
commented on drafts, discussed concepts, shared research, and their enthusiasm for this area of enquiry. 
 
4 David (2001) defines “human capital” as “acquired human capabilities, which are durable traits, yielding 
some positive effects upon performance in socially valued activities”. 
5 While a wide range of policies can influence human capital formation, the phrase “human capital 
policies” in this paper refers primarily to policies purposefully designed to affect the level, diversity and 
relative availability of human capabilities. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  9 
A wide range of secondary questions follow: 
 
•  What dimensions of human capital are most important for well-being? 
•  What is the importance of formal education compared to other influences on 
human capital formation – e.g. families, workplaces and the community?  What 
scope has government to affect human capital formation through these other 
channels? 
•  Which level of formal education (early childhood, primary, secondary, tertiary) 
should receive additional policy attention? 
•  Where should new resources be allocated or existing resources re-allocated, by 
mode of education and subject area? 
•  Given a strong role for private decisions by families, individual students, 
education providers and firms, what is the appropriate role for government?   
What problems does government involvement address?  What problems does it 
entail?  What sort of institutions and what regulatory, funding and financing 
arrangements are best? 
The purpose of this paper is to improve the basis for reasonable judgements on a 
number of these issues, in the New Zealand context. 
 HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  10 
SCOPE 
Part one looks at the mechanisms by which the accumulation of human capital 
contributes to economic growth, and evidence on the importance of these mechanisms.  
It is mostly based on a report commissioned by the Treasury from Paul A. David, All 
Souls College, Oxford and Stanford Universities, entitled  “Knowledge, Capabilities and 
Human Capital Formation in Economic Growth”6.  It also draws on recent empirical 
evidence, including an OECD cross-country study of the determinants of growth 
(OECD 2000b, Temple 2000, Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). 
 
Part two looks at the evidence on how policies designed to influence the formation of 
human capital can be used to influence the distribution of income.  It draws on a report 
commissioned by the Treasury from Daron Acemoglu, Department of Economics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology entitled “Human Capital Policies and the 
Distribution of Income:  A Framework for Analysis and Literature Review” (Acemoglu, 
2001b).   
 
An initial focus on per capita average income and the distribution of individual incomes 
is useful, because it allows some quantifiable analysis of human capital effects across 
countries, and across time in a way that is not easily achievable for other channels by 
which human capital contributes to well-being. 
 
Part three looks at the implications from Parts one and two for growth and 
distributional objectives taken together. 
 
Part four considers whether and how the policy implications from Parts one and two 
need to be modified in light of evidence on a broader set of channels by which human 
capital policies influence well-being.  This relies on empirical research reported in an 
OECD paper “The Well-being of Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital:   
Human and Social Capital and Sustained Growth and Development” (OECD 2001a). 
 
Part five describes relevant features of the level and distribution of human capital in 
New Zealand over time, using a variety of data sources that allow international 
comparisons. 
 
Part six draws tentative conclusions about opportunities for improving well-being in 
New Zealand through human capital policies.  It refers to current broad policy settings 
and outlines areas where future policy development may be most fruitful. 
 
                                                
6 David (2001). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  11 
PART ONE   HUMAN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The purpose here is to outline economists’ understanding of the mechanisms by which 
human capital influences economic growth, the evidence at a broad macro-economic 
level for the importance of those influences, and historical and micro-economic 
evidence on how these mechanisms have operated in major developed economies. 
 
Human capital has many dimensions, and is acquired through a variety of processes in 
different settings 
In considering this evidence, several points need to be considered: 
 
•  Human capital is formed in a number of different settings, cumulatively over an 
individual’s life time.  There are a wide variety of processes by which people 
acquire skills and capabilities. 
•  Human capital has many dimensions, which can influence productivity and hence 
growth in a variety of ways, both directly and indirectly. 
•  There are positive feedback loops connecting individual and societal outcomes.  
For instance, capabilities in one generation influence the acquisition of 
capabilities in the next.  Higher productivity and earnings allow more resources to 
be devoted to human capital investments.  In addition, human capital acquired 
early in life, makes it easier to acquire more human capital later on.   
Understanding these processes will be important for identifying where policies 
are likely to have the largest long-term impact. 
Measures commonly used in empirical work, or for the purposes of policy evaluation, 
usually capture only a small part of this complexity.  Government policies have more 
direct influence on some factors influencing human capital formation, than others.  In 
sum, it is inherently exceedingly difficult to ascertain the true effects of human capital 
policies on individual and societal well-being.7 
 




                                                
7 Some of the important issues that need to be considered in assessing the empirical evidence are set out 
in the Appendix. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  12 



































Source: David (2001) 
 
Purely private decisions about human capital may not lead to the best outcomes for 
society 
A further issue, highlighted by Figure 2 is that human capital formation is substantially 
shaped by the decisions of families, young people, education providers and firms.   
There are a number of reasons why private decisions by themselves may not lead to 
the best level and type of human capital formation for society as a whole.  Some 
important instances are: 
 
•  Individuals may not have the means to support themselves while they are 
undertaking education and training and may not be able to borrow for this 
purpose (with the intention of repaying loans through higher earnings later on). 
•  Human capital acquired by one individual may benefit many others (for instance 
through a lower probability of crime, or through enabling more productive 
technologies to be used).  However individuals may mostly only consider the 
direct benefits to themselves (through earnings, job satisfaction, or social status 
for instance) in deciding how much and what type of human capital to acquire. 
•  In labour markets that are not fully competitive, employees may not get the full 
benefit of their skills in terms of earnings.  Their employer will get a pecuniary 
benefit from their skills that employees do not take into account when making 
their education decisions8.  
                                                
8 This effect, and those covered in the next two bullet points apply to all investments, not just education. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  13 
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Source: David (2001) 
 
•  It is difficult for individuals (students and education providers9) to tell what sorts 
of knowledge, skills and capabilities will be in high demand many years into the 
future.  Likewise, firms investing in new technology may not know whether 
workers will have the skills needed to use it when it comes on stream.  Firms, 
education providers and students might have different expectations about the 
future, leading to a mismatch between skills and technology.  Unless they can co-
ordinate their expectations, each might find it better to wait before making specific 
education and technology investments. 
•  Employers and workers may not be able to agree on the provision of workplace 
training, because authorities enforcing contracts might find it difficult to verify 
whether appropriate quality training has been provided.  Workers might be 
                                                
9 Bureaucrats and politicians will face a similar difficulty in a publicly managed system. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  14 
unwilling to accept lower wages to reflect lower productivity during training, 
unless they are confident they will receive good quality training. 
•  Individuals may spend time and trouble to acquire qualifications, even when they 
do not thereby acquire much greater capability, because employers value 
qualifications as a sign that the holder has natural ability, and can be more readily 
trained10.  (This may imply that the social value of education will be less than the 
private value.)   
David and many other economists believe that these are among the reasons why 
government policies can lead to better outcomes for social well-being than if decisions 
were left up to private individuals alone, using their own resources.  Of course, in 
practice, governments typically have a large involvement in funding, financing, 
regulating and providing education and training.  The relevant policy question is not 
whether government should be involved, but what the nature and level of that 
involvement should be, and what changes to the status quo will lead to improvements 
in well-being.  These issues will be explored further in the New Zealand context in 
Parts five and six. 
 
Human capital and macro-economic growth - theory and empirics 
The causal relationship between human capital and growth is far from settled either 
theoretically or empirically 
Economists have modelled and estimated the relationship between human capital 
formation and economic growth across countries, in a variety of ways  posing differing 
implications for policy. 
 
An earlier generation of growth models (following Solow, 1956, 1957 and Swan, 1956) 
required an assumption of ongoing efficiency enhancing technological change to 
explain positive “steady state” growth rates in labour productivity.  The models allowed 
a distinction between factors (such as the accumulation of physical capital per unit of 
labour), which cause a shift in the steady state level of labour productivity11, and 
factors (such as technological change) which affect the growth rate, itself. 
 
More recent models have explicitly introduced human capital, and in various ways 
assumed that technological change occurs as a result of economic activity itself.  In 
one strand of models following Lucas (1988), human capital is another input into 
production, but one for which there are not diminishing returns to scale.  In the other 
strand, following Romer (1990), Young (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the main 
contribution of human capital to growth is through technological innovation.  In both 
cases, positive steady state rates of growth in per capita output are explained by “spill-
overs” from human capital12.   
 
As David argues, the two strands make distinctive predictions about the relationship 
between human capital and steady-state growth of output per unit of labour:  “When 
skilled labour is considered solely as an input for production, the growth of output can 
only be affected by different rates of human capital accumulation, but when human 
capital is thought of as a factor of innovation, growth is sensitive to the level of the 
                                                
10 Referred to as the “signalling” effect of education – see Part two. 
11 This result is due to an assumption of diminishing marginal returns to factor accumulation. 
12 David (2001) provides a brief discussion of this theoretical literature.  For a more extended discussion, 
see, for example, Jenkins (1995). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  15 
human capital stock13.”  Cross-country empirical studies have, however, at least until 
recently, struggled both to find robust effects on output of rates of accumulation and 
level of human capital, and, in any case, to convincingly distinguish between them. 
 
David concludes that there is only weak empirical evidence for the hypothesis that 
changes in the human capital stock affect growth rates, but strong evidence for the 
stock of human capital having an effect.  However the effect of the stock on growth 
rates diminishes as the average level of human capital grows – and is small in OECD 
countries14.   
 
The most recent evidence (see Temple, 2000; OECD, 2000b; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 
2001), using superior data sets and methodologies, does, however, find a positive 
relationship between changes in the stock of human capital in OECD countries and 
increases in output per capita15.  Bassanini and Scarpetta estimate that an increase of 
one year in average years of education in the working age population has a long–term 
effect on the level of output per capita of roughly 6%.   
 
In a different line of research, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that measures of labour 
force quality derived from international science and mathematics tests of school aged 
children appear to be strongly associated with average growth rates, in a sample of 
mostly developed countries over the period 1960-1990.  Variation in test performance 
is a much stronger predictor of growth than variation in years of schooling alone.  In 
particular, a one standard deviation improvement in an index based on performance 
over a range of tests leads to a 1 percentage point increase in average annual growth 
rates over the period16. 
 
However, the relevance of much of this evidence to policy is limited by a number of 
factors.   
 
First, the contribution of human capital to growth in output is limited, in cross-country 
models, by “convergence”.  Countries with already higher levels of output per capita 
(and, usually with higher average years of schooling in the working age population) 
have less scope to increase output through further human capital accumulation17.  
                                                
13 As Jenkins (1995) points out, the Romer type of model more specifically predicts that it is the stock of 
human capital in research and development that determines the long run growth rate in labour productivity.  
This has rarely been directly tested empirically.  Jenkins cites the example of Ochoa (1994), who, for three 
manufacturing sectors in 11 OECD countries finds a positive effect of scientific human capital on 
productivity growth rates.  Nevertheless, Ochoa acknowledges the causality of this relationship is hard to 
pin down. 
14 See Krueger & Lindahl (2000). 
15 They argue that the effects are too large to be consistent with a simple neo-classical growth model, but 
nevertheless note that it is unclear whether to interpret the result as representing an effect on the steady 
state level of output per unit of labour, or an effect on the steady state growth rate itself.  They 
“conservatively” opt for the former interpretation (OECD, 2000b). 
16 Within the limitations of the data, Hanushek and Kimko test for reverse causality, omitted variable bias, 
and the effects of East Asian countries which have had high growth rates, and perform strongly on the 
mathematics and science tests.  They remain puzzled by the strength of the relationship they have found 
between test performance and economic growth – it may partly reflect mis-measurement of the schooling 
variable, and suggest that their results are supportive of the idea that there are strong externalities to 
quality of schooling (as measured by test scores).  They also investigate countries whose actual growth 
rates are not well explained by test scores.  One such country is the United States, whose growth rate is 
stronger than would be expected from test scores.  They suggest that this may reflect the acknowledged 
excellence of tertiary education in the United States – a factor not investigated in their study. 
17 Though, taken at face value, the Hanushek and Kimko (2000) evidence suggests that improvement in 
quality of education (measured by achievement levels) may continue to be an effective route for raising 
output, even for countries with high average years of education. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  16 
Temple (2000) thus argues that the main value of the findings is to give comfort to 
OECD governments that they have not over-invested in education.  David, for similar 
reasons, concludes that aiming at a general raising of average years of schooling 
would not be a useful policy for New Zealand. 
 
Historical and microeconomic studies provide further evidence on the mechanisms 
which link human capital to growth 
Second, conventional empirically estimated macro-economic growth models have a 
number of serious limitations.  Important amongst these is that they abstract from 
historical processes, and do not identify the underlying mechanisms that link education 
to growth.  Economic history draws attention to growth characterised as a process of 
extended transitions, driven by technological innovations, between steady-state growth 
paths.  David argues that since the early 20
th century, skill biased technological 
progress has been the main force leading to the rise in importance of human capital 
compared to other inputs into production, and that this was largely not the result of 
government policies to subsidise mass education.  These, in fact, were induced by 
changes on the demand side of the labour market. 
 
David argues that the increased demand for educated workers was particularly 
associated with a need for organisational change in industry associated with the 
dissemination of new general-purpose technologies (such as factory electrification, 
and, more recently, the microelectronics-based digital computer).   
 
Over the same period in the United States, technological progress stimulated “an 
increasing demand for scientists and engineers and supporting personnel, who could 
carry on the necessary knowledge-generating and knowledge-applications activities”.  
Abramovitz and David (1999) document how colleges and universities in the United 
States responded to this demand, (driven by the need for financial backing from 
industry either directly or through taxation) through adapting curricula, and establishing 
new areas of study. 
 
Looking at the comparative 20
th century growth experience of the United States, Britain 
and Germany, Broadberry (2000) concludes that, while they had similar levels of 
school enrolments, their productivity records were quite different.  He attributes this to 
varying emphases on vocational training and formal education.  The United States 
specialised in higher level skills (particularly for managerial and research tasks) from 
formal education, that were used in mass production in combination with unskilled 
labour.   Germany followed the opposite path – specialising in intermediate skills learnt 
though vocational training, which were used in a handicraft, “flexible system” of 
production.  Britain tried to accumulate both types of human capital, and fell behind the 
United States in high level skills, and Germany in intermediate ones18. 
 
David concludes: “This … reinforces the general message that a simplistic view of 
human capital accumulation cannot yield an adequate account of the historical patterns 
of growth: the industrial path followed – mass production or flexible production; oriented 
                                                
18 Nickell and Van Reenen (2000), surveying the period since 1970, reach a similar conclusion, though 
their emphasis is on British managerial skills lagging those in the United States, and middle-level technical 
skills lagging those in Germany.  More generally, OECD (2001b) p.31, following Gemmell (1996) and 
others points to evidence that: “Higher education is particularly important [for growth] in OECD countries 
…”.  However, unlike the most recent studies, Gemmell does not use data for the human capital stock 
corrected for mismeasurement, nor panel data methods made possible by annual data (instead averages 
across a 25 year period are used in the regression).  It is doubtful that much reliance should be placed on 
this finding for policy purposes.   HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  17 
to industry or services – determines the need for different kinds of human capital, and 
this in turn depends on the resources and conditions of the country.” 
 
David draws attention to “the important implications of the reciprocal links between 
technological change and human capital formation”.  The supply of human capital of 
various sorts enables new technologies to be developed, adopted and operated.  To a 
large extent however, human capital formation responds to and is guided by demand 
coming from the labour market.  Particularly in the short term, inadequate supply side 
responses may produce “widening pay differentials or increased rates of occupational 
obsolescence and structural unemployment”. 
 
A range of cross-country and within-country microeconomic studies investigate the 
relationship between human capital, technology adoption and productivity in particular 
industries.  For instance Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) find that relative demand for 
educated workers was greater in sectors where newer vintages of capital equipment 
had been installed; and Wolff (1996) finds that in United States industries in the period 
1970-85 the growth of cognitive skill levels among employees was positively correlated 
with indicators of recent technological change.  Nickell and Nicolitsas (1997) find that 
persistent skill shortages in a firm’s industry lead to permanent reductions in its fixed 
capital investment and temporary reductions in research and development 
expenditures.   Stoneman and Kwon (1996) demonstrate the relationship between 
technology adoption and profitability in the United Kingdom engineering industry.   
 
Zucker et al. (1988) study the relationship between the growth and location of relevant 
scientific research, the role of outstanding scientists, and the growth and location of the 
biotechnology industry in the United States in the 15 years following 197519.  Moretti 
(1999) finds that manufacturing plants (particularly those using human capital intensive 
production) in cities with a better-educated population are equipped with better 
technology, and have higher productivity20.  Berman and Machin (2000) find that the 
transfer between countries of skill-biased technology is central to the increased 
demand for skilled workers in the manufacturing sectors in middle-income countries. 
 
Summary 
Taken together, the macro-economic, historical and micro-economic evidence all lend 
firm support to the idea that productivity and economic growth are driven by skill-biased 
technological progress.  This is dependent on the supply both of highly skilled experts 
and managers – associated with the creation and adoption of new technologies  – and 
a workforce with good general skills to operate them. 
                                                
19 Their work suggests that “star” scientists with a commercial interest in appropriating the benefits of their 
research played an important role in the growth of the industry. 
20 He argues, from analysis of longitudinal data, that the most likely explanation is human capital spill-
overs from learning amongst workers. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  18 
PART TWO   HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
INCOME 
Education, skills and capabilities are correlated with earnings 
Data across time and countries show a strong positive correlation between individuals’ 
education, skills and capabilities, and their earnings.  To the extent that governments 
are concerned about a widening distribution of income, or more particularly about the 
adequacy of incomes towards the bottom of the distribution, it is natural to consider the 
role that human capital policies can play. 
 
If a widening distribution of earnings reflects increasing premia for skills21 in short 
supply, then it might be possible to reduce dispersion by producing greater numbers of 
highly educated workers.  On the other hand, raising the skills of the low skilled may be 
more effective in increasing the adequacy of their earnings, as well as in narrowing the 
overall distribution of earnings.   
 
However, if, as some economists believe, the relationship between education and 
earnings reflects to a significant extent its value to employers as a signal of innate 
ability, rather than of acquired skills, then human capital policies might not be effective 
in improving distributional outcomes.  Acemoglu (2001b) synthesises the theoretical 
and empirical literature on each of these questions. 
 
Skill-biased technological change helps explain a widening dispersion of earnings 
He concludes that: 
 
•  While other factors are relevant (e.g. deunionisation, openness to trade, welfare 
provisions), skill-biased technological change and consequent increases in skill 
premia are a major contributor to increased earnings inequality in OECD 
countries22.  
•  Greater openness to trade does not appear to have been a major factor in the 
widening of the earnings distribution.   
•  Standard supply and demand analysis suggests that an increased supply of skill 
will reduce skill premia, other things being equal.  However, technologies adjust 
to the supply of skills23, and, the historical record in the United States suggests 
(see figure 3) that the effect of increased supply on skill premia is likely to be 
small24.  On realistic assumptions about the rate at which other labour will be 
substituted for college educated labour as its wage rises25, Acemoglu estimates 
                                                
21 The term “skill premium”, defined empirically in a number of ways, refers to the extent to which earnings 
of skilled workers exceed those of the unskilled. 
22 He notes that while increased returns to education account for some of the increase in earnings 
dispersion, there is evidence for increased returns to skills within education categories, which will account 
for more of the increase in earnings dispersion.  He considers that the analysis based on premia for 
education will apply more generally to all skill premia (see Acemoglu 2001b). 
23 Acemoglu refers to his own work on this (1998, 1999) & argues that it applies as much to technology 
adoption as to technology creation.  The essential point is that an increase in the supply of skills creates, in 
part at least, its own demand.  (See also Nickell & Nicolitsas, 1997). 
24 Maani (1999) shows that returns to education in New Zealand increased strongly over the period 1981 
to 1996, and were accompanied by rapid increases in participation in tertiary education, translating into a 
steady rise in the proportion of the working age population with tertiary qualifications – see Figure 4. 
25 Technically referred to as the elasticity of substitution between college educated and other labour. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  19 
that the relative demand for the latter has increased by 200-300% between 1940 
and 1990, having accelerated after 1970.   
 
Figure 3.  Relative supply of college skills and college premium (U.S) 
 
3 
The behaviour of the (log) college premium and relative supply of college skills (weeks worked by 
college equivalents divided by weeks worked by non-college equivalents) between 1939 and 1996.  
Data from March CPSs and 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses. 
Source: Acemoglu (2001) 
 
•  In any case, because the flows of skills are small relative to the stock, this 
mechanism would take a long time to have any effect on earnings dispersion, 
even without increased demand.  Acemoglu calculates that an economy that 
doubles its output of college-educated workers would reduce skill premia by only 
16 per cent after 10 years26.  Similarly, immigration will have little effect on skill 
premia 27.  
•  It might be expected that higher skill premia will be self-correcting through 
encouraging further schooling.  However, as noted above, the effect of increased 
supply on skill premia is limited, and, moreover, in some data there is a surprising 
lack of correlation between education premia and education investments28.  
Nevertheless, Acemoglu acknowledges that the evidence on this is ambiguous.   
•  As Figure 4 shows, the broad New Zealand data for the last two decades does 
suggest that rising returns to education investments were accompanied by an 
increase in tertiary education completion. 
                                                
26 This result depends on empirical estimates of the rate at which other labour is substituted for college-
educated labour, as wages of the latter rise.  Acemoglu postulates an economy that starts with 25% of its 
workers college educated. 
27 He refers to U.S. research by Card (1990), and by Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1997), in support of this. 
28 Acemoglu & Pischke (2000) analyse college enrolments across U.S. states and find no correlation 
between wage inequality and changes in college enrolments.  They argue that migration effects, which 
might explain this, are limited.  They also look at cross-country evidence in the OECD and come to the 
same conclusion.  They acknowledge, though, that the increase in enrolments in the U.S. during the 1980s 
is consistent with demand-induced increases in supply. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  20 
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•  Reducing the dispersion of skills (by raising those in the bottom tail of the 
distribution of skills) is likely to be the most effective human capital policy to 
address income dispersion and particularly adequacy issues29.  
•  However, if a significant part of the relationship between education and earnings 
were due to “signalling effects” then increasing educational attainment in the 
bottom tail might not be effective in reducing dispersion.  Evidence from the 
United States, controlling for age and cohort effects30, suggests, however, that 
changes in signalling effects are not very important in explaining changes in skill 
premia.  Other evidence looks at whether social returns to compulsory schooling 
(measured through average earnings) are similar in magnitude to private returns, 
and concludes that they are31.  This also supports the idea that signalling effects 
are small. 
•  In the United States changes in the types of jobs that firms create (“good jobs” 
versus “bad jobs”) may have been important in shaping the wage distribution32.  
However, this is likely to have been driven by technology – and does not affect 
the conclusion about putting a top priority on raising the skills of those towards 
                                                
29 Recent research using data from the International Adult Literacy Study shows that differences among 
countries in skill premia explain more of the cross-country variation in the distribution of earnings, than do 
differences in the distribution of skills.  (See Devroye & Freeman, 2001; Blau & Kahn, 2001).  This 
suggests that while making an important contribution, policies that compress the distribution of skills will 
not, by themselves, eliminate differences in the distribution of earnings across countries. 
30 This evidence looks at whether changes in skill premia, or the demand for skill occurred within groups 
of workers defined by particular cohorts and ages.  For the period 1970 – 1990 there were increases in 
skill premia within these groups (see Table 2, Acemoglu 2001b). 
31 Acemoglu & Angrist (2000).  The methodology relies on across state variations in compulsory schooling 
laws, as a means to identify the true effects of additional years of schooling. 
32 Acemoglu argues that there may be pecuniary externalities to more productive high-quality jobs, due to 
imperfectly competitive labour markets enabling employees to bargain to higher wages.  Employers do not 
take these benefits to employees into account, which leads to an under supply of such jobs from an 
efficiency perspective. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  21 
the bottom of the distribution of skills.  In Acemoglu’s model, raising skills at the 
bottom can induce an increased supply of better jobs. 
 
 
Literacy and numeracy skills are particularly important for improving 
labour market outcomes of those in the bottom part of the distribution 
of skills 
A large body of accumulated evidence (e.g. Bishop, 1992; Murnane et al. 1995; 
Pryor & Schaffer, 1999; Murnane et al. 2000) suggests that cognitive skills have 
become increasingly important for individual employment and earnings outcomes 
in developed countries.  New Zealand analysis (Maré and Chapple, 2000) of data 
from the International Adult Literacy Study shows that, as in other countries, even 
when educational attainment is taken into account, literacy and numeracy skills 
appear to have an additional effect on outcomes.  New Zealand is among a 
group of countries where there is a particularly strong earnings penalty to having 
only low-level literacy and numeracy skills33. 
 
Recent research in the United Kingdom (Machin et al. 2001) using longitudinal 
data from the National Child Development study suggests that raising numeracy 
skills is particularly important for improving labour market outcomes for those in 
the lower part of the distribution of skills (while improving literacy has a stronger 
effect for those who are already well skilled).  The research also suggests that 
basic literacy and numeracy have a more important and more robust effect than 
a range of other “soft skills”34 and attitudes on labour market outcomes. 
   
While other skills (for instance capacity for team work, problem solving and 
adaptability) are undoubtedly also important, little systematic evidence is 
available on how these skills are acquired, variations in them across the 
population, or their effects on labour market outcomes.  It is thus difficult, at 




                                                
33 See OECD and Statistics Canada (1997), Figure 2.2. 
34 Measured by school attendance, teachers’ and parents’ views of the individual’s social skills and ability 
to interact with others at age 16, respondents’ assessment of their own people skills, and caring skills. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  22 
PART THREE  HUMAN CAPITAL, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Skill-biased technological progress is an important driver of economic growth and partly 
explains a widening dispersion of income in some countries 
Parts one and two together suggest that: 
 
•  There is reasonably strong evidence that skill-biased technological change has 
played a strong role in economic growth in developed economies over the last 70 
years, and, at least over the last 25 years, has played a significant role in the 
widening of the distribution of income in a number of countries35. 
•  The relationship between skill-biased technological change, economic growth 
and the distribution of earnings is complex, and influenced by a range of factors.  
Much will depend on the circumstances of particular countries: the sectoral 
structure of their economies; the way in which their industries are organised; 
labour market regulation and welfare policies; the nature of formal and informal 
education and their linkages to industry; and the quality and distribution of the 
existing stock of human capital.  In addition, increased supply of skilled labour 
may, itself, induce further technological change.  Countries show marked 
differences in both growth patterns and the trajectory of income inequality over 
time36.  
Countries with a wide dispersion of skills are likely to experience a widening dispersion 
of earnings in the face of rapid technological change 
•  All else being equal, it is likely that the faster the pace of skill-biased 
technological change, the more likely there will be a widening dispersion of 
earnings.  
•  Countries that utilise a high-skill/low-skill mix of labour inputs (see Broadberry, 
2000) are likely to be more vulnerable to a widening dispersion in the face of 
rapid skill-biased technological change.  This is partly because the current level 
of human capital in families and communities has a strong effect on formation of 
human capital in the next generation.  Similarly, much human capital is formed 
“on-the-job” – people who have only worked in low skilled jobs will have a weaker 
base from which to adapt to new skill-biased technologies.    
•  An important issue for New Zealand is that it is a small, open, middle-income 
country, competing in an international market for highly skilled labour.  To an 
extent, earnings at the top of the distribution of skills are likely to be set 
externally, irrespective of the numbers of skilled workers produced locally.  
Technological progress requires a mix of highly specialised and general skills 
•  Technological progress drives growth, and seems to require at least the following 
types of capabilities (aspects of which are not acquired primarily through formal 
education): 
                                                
35 Acemoglu notes that while there is an academic debate, many economists believe that the speed of 
skill-biased technical change has been somewhat faster over the past 25 years.  Acemoglu (2001a) 
summarises and evaluates the evidence. 
36 These issues are touched on in Treasury  (2001b). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  23 
   People who have the high technical skills (in the appropriate areas) and 
creativity to create or adopt new technologies – and behind this, people 
who have high levels of generic skills that will enable them to learn 
efficiently specific technical skills demanded by emerging technologies; 
   People with the required entrepreneurial and management skills to 
identify opportunities, organise the financing of investments, and 
design and manage new ways of organising to make optimal use of 
new technologies;   
   People with the skills to operate the new technology and to work 
effectively in the new forms of organisation.  While there is evidence 
that cognitive skills have become more important, a range of other 
skills and qualities are also important, including the ability to work in 
teams, to problem solve, and to be adaptable. 
•  On the other hand, the most effective human capital policies to address income 
adequacy and income distribution concerns are likely to be aimed at raising the 
skills of people in the bottom part of the distribution of skills. 
Raising skills in the bottom part of the distribution will reduce pressures on other policy 
instruments 
In addition to direct effects on well-being, improving skills to address distributional 
concerns will reduce the need to use other instruments (such as income transfers, 
labour market regulation, and taxation) which appear to have adverse effects on 
economic growth over the longer term37.  As Part Four discusses, raising skills at the 
bottom will likely have other positive effects on social functioning that may also have 
indirect effects on economic growth. 
 
Comparisons with other developed countries will help guide where New Zealand 
should put its effort 
If the best human capital policies to improve the production of skills for growth are 
different from those to raise incomes for those at the bottom of the distribution of skills, 
and each require large amounts of extra resources, then clearly there will be a trade-
off.  The trade-off might be evaluated in terms of contributions at the margins to 
productivity and economic growth, but other effects on well-being and equity objectives 
also need to be considered.  One guide to evaluating these issues are comparisons of 
levels and distribution of human capital across similarly developed countries.  Part five 
will consider how New Zealand compares with other OECD countries in these respects. 
 
                                                
37 See OECD (2001b). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  24 
PART FOUR   HUMAN CAPITAL AND WELL-BEING38 
Human capital is positively associated with other factors affecting well-being 
Individual and community levels of education have a strong association with a range of 
social benefits that are aspects of human well-being.  Better-educated people tend to 
be healthier.  This association may be due to a number of factors other than higher 
income.  More educated people adopt healthier habits and life styles – for instance, 
they are less likely to smoke or drink heavily, and to be overweight, and they engage in 
more exercise.  They may be exposed to fewer occupational hazards.  They may be 
able to better access and use health related information39. 
 
Higher levels of education lead to lower take up of social transfer benefits (even when 
eligible), and, of course, through higher wages, to paying more tax (Wolfe and 
Haveman, 2000).  More educated people conduct labour market search more efficiently 
and effectively.  They also tend to be more efficient consumers (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 
1992). 
 
The children of better-educated parents themselves do better at school.  Moreover 
children in communities where the average level of education is higher are more likely 
to complete secondary schooling, other things being constant.  Individual education 
levels are associated with a lower risk of crime, and there is an additional effect from 
average levels of education in a community40. 
 
Education and literacy skills are positively associated with levels of political and social 
engagement, and participation in voluntary community activities, as well as in 
resources devoted to charity.  They are also associated with higher levels of trust, 
tolerance of diversity, commitment to equality of opportunities and resistance to political 
alienation41. 
 
Finally, education has both an immediate and long-term positive association with self-
reported happiness, even when taking account of the effects of family income 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000).  Moreover, there is evidence that this is not just a 
relative effect – individual happiness is also positively correlated with average levels of 
education in the community (Putnam, 2000). 
 
… but again causal effects are difficult to untangle 
Despite this evidence, it is difficult to untangle and quantify the causal effects of 
education on well-being.  As OECD (2001a) notes: “Some of the influences … may be 
mediated by the fostering of habits, characteristics and attitudes which assist job 
creation, productivity, personal well-being, positive time preferences and self-discipline.  
Some of these characteristics as well as innate abilities and attributes are formed 
outside formal education but are highly correlated with schooling.”   
 
                                                
38 The following discussion relies primarily on a summary of the evidence presented in OECD (2001a). 
39 Kenkel (1991).  Kenkel finds, nevertheless, that education appears to have an effect on health 
independent of income, race, social background and other factors, including use of health related 
information. 
40 Sandefur, McLanahan, and Wojtkiewicz, (1989); Wolfe and Haveman (2000). 
41 Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); Hodgkinson and Weitzman (1988); Schuller et al. (2000); Bynner 
et al. (2000);  OECD and Statistics Canada (2000);  Helliwell and Putnam (1999).  Other researchers – for 
instance Nie, Juhn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) argue that relative rather than absolute levels of education are 
the key determinant of civic participation. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  25 
In addition there is the problem of reverse causality – some of the outcome measures 
may have a causal effect on education.  The lack of consistent measurement of 
outcomes, and of large cross-country data sets providing regular measurement over 
time, make the inference of causality even more difficult than in the case of education, 
productivity, earnings and growth (see Appendix). 
 
… Nevertheless, indirect effects of human capital on well-being and social outcomes 
could be as large as the direct effects through earnings and growth 
Despite the difficulties in establishing causal effects, researchers (Wolfe and Haveman, 
2000; Wolfe and Zuvekas, 1997; Bynner et al., 2000; McMahon, 2000, Schuller et al., 
2000) have begun the task of attempting to quantify these benefits.  One approach is to 
value them at the cost of alternative means of obtaining the desired outcome.  These 
approaches typically find that the social benefits of education (controlling for direct 




•  Evidence suggests that, while causal effects are uncertain, human capital 
contributes to individual well-being through many channels, in addition to direct 
productivity and earnings effects.   
•  It follows from this that effects of low human capital on earnings may be 
compounded through effects on other dimensions of well-being such as health.  
Also, to the extent that individuals with low human capital live in communities with 
average low levels of human capital, they are likely to experience additional harm 
to their well-being, over and above that due to their own low level42.  
•  Human capital formation is likely to increase individual and societal well-being, 
even if it does not lead to participation in the labour market.  This is obviously 
relevant for two groups – people with disabilities that prevent such participation, 
and older people who are near or who have already entered retirement. 
•  The mechanisms discussed in this Part mostly reinforce the particular benefits for 
the distribution of well-being from raising human capital in the bottom part of the 
current distribution of skills.   
•  On the other hand, some of the mechanisms discussed in this section (for 
instance, effects on charitable giving, voluntary community participation, political 
participation, commitment to equality of opportunities) may be just as relevant in 
other parts of the distribution of skills. 
 
                                                
42 The issue of “neighbourhood effects” is discussed in the accompanying paper on “Geography and the 
Inclusive Economy”. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  26 
PART FIVE   THE LEVEL AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
Comparisons with other OECD countries may help guide New Zealand’s policy effort 
Comparisons across countries of current levels of human capital, and measures of its 
quality and distribution, may be useful to guide further policy effort to increase growth 
and raise well-being.  Trends over time, and comparisons with other developed 
(OECD) countries43 may help identify areas where progress is slow, and where our 
patterns diverge most from those of successful countries. 
 
Unfortunately, the measures of human capital that allow reliable comparison across 
countries and across time are limited in scope.  They do not, for instance, usually cover 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills, or “softer” skills such as capacity for teamwork, 
problem solving and adaptability, that are likely also to be important for labour market 
success.  In addition, it is important to note that New Zealand’s economy has a 
different structure to other OECD countries, has followed a different historical path and 
has social and cultural differences.  All these will probably be important for the types of 
human capital that are at present most relevant to growth and well-being here.   
International comparisons are useful, but should be tempered by these considerations. 
 
The following discussion selects three dimensions by which to compare human capital 
in New Zealand to other OECD countries: 
 
•  Average education attainment in the population, and participation in post-
compulsory education. 
•  The quality of achievement. 
•  The distribution of achievement. 
Average education attainment, and participation in post-compulsory 
education 
New Zealand has high average years of education in the working age population 
 
Average years of education (working age population, selected OECD countries) 
 
 1971  1998 
  Years  Rank (of 21)  Years  Rank (of 21) 
Australia  11.1 3 12.3 5 
Canada  11.4 2 12.9 2 
Germany 9.7  9  13.5  1 
New  Zealand  10.3 5 11.8 9 
Portugal  6.5 20 7.7 21 
Spain  5.8 21 8.7 20 
U.K.  9.2 11  11.9 8 
U.S.  11.6 1 12.7 4 
Source: OECD (2000b) 44 
                                                
43 In the material that follows, a range of methods of comparison are used, including New Zealand’s 
overall ranking amongst participating countries, and mean scores compared with selected countries. 
Comparator countries are selected partly because of their similar histories of education provision (the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada) or because they indicate the range of outcomes. 
44 Human capital is measured “by estimates of the average number of years of education among the 
working-age population, based on figures on educational attainment and assumptions about how many 
years of education a particular level of education represents.”  While this is “only  a proxy” … ”it is an 
improvement with respect to the measures generally used in the literature.  It relies on OECD data on HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  27 
 
… but its rank has slipped over the last 30 years 
The increase in average years of education between 1971 and 1998 ranged from 1.1 
years (the United States) to 3.8 (Germany).  New Zealand, at 1.5, had the fourth 
smallest increase (after Portugal and Australia) followed closely by Canada and 
Denmark.  Overall there appears to be a tendency for countries with initially high 
average years of education to have low growth in this variable. 
 
 
Growth effects of New Zealand’s falling ranking in average years of 
education 
While the OECD (2000b) estimates should not be taken too literally, it is useful to 
consider what extra “steady state” output per capita would have been achieved, if New 
Zealand had maintained its ranking of fifth.  At fifth in 1998, average years of education 
would have been 12.3 (the same as Australia and Japan), 0.5 of a year more than New 
Zealand’s actual 11.8.  Thus (on an extremely rough calculation using the average 
relationship between years of schooling and output per capita) output per capita would 
have been 3% higher in 1998, if New Zealand had maintained its fifth ranking45.  To set 
this in context, the average annual growth rate in per capita output over the period 1974 
to 1997 was 0.53%, corresponding to an actual overall increase in output per capita of 
13%.  As noted above the actual increase in average years of education in the working 
age population was 1.5.  
 
 
Participation in tertiary education has increased, and is relatively high 
Over this period, participation in tertiary education in New Zealand has increased, and 
currently is relatively high.   
 
Expected years of tertiary education for all 17-year olds (1990, 1997): 
 
 1990  1997 
Australia 2.9  3.7 
Canada 3.4  4.1 
New Zealand  2.1  3.1 
United Kingdom  1.2  2.4 
United States  3.4  3.7 
OECD country mean  1.7  2.4 
 
Source: Education at a Glance (OECD, 2000) 
 
New Zealand was ranked fifth on this measure (out of 25 countries) in both 1990 and 
1997.  At the same time, New Zealand in 1998 had the highest tertiary “net entry 
rates”46 in the OECD for “Tertiary Type A ”, and the second highest (after Korea) for 
“Type B”47. 
                                                                                                                                          
education attainment and the revised Barro-Lee (1996) dataset  based on the work of De La Fuente and 
Domenech (2000)”. 
45 This calculation assumes, amongst other things, that the OECD (2000b) estimates reflect a causal 
relationship from education to output per capita, and that the effects are linear – an extra year of education 
in a country with low levels has the same effect as an extra year in a country with high levels.  Thus 3% 
may be considered an upper bound. 
46 The meaning of the “net entry rate” measure is not intuitively obvious:  “[They] … represent the 
proportion of persons of a synthetic age cohort who enter a certain level of tertiary education at one point 
during their lives.  The net entry rates are defined as the sum of net entry rates for single ages.  The total 
net entry rate is therefore the sum of the proportions of new entrants at Tertiary … aged i to the total HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  28 
 
In addition, New Zealand has comparatively high survival rates in tertiary education, 
and among the highest graduation rates48 from Tertiary-type A first degrees in the 
OECD. 
 
New Zealand also appears to have comparatively high levels of participation in adult 
education and training 
% of population aged 16-65 participating in adult education and training during 




New Zealand  47.5 
United Kingdom  43.9 
United States  39.7 
 
Source: OECD and Statistics Canada, 1997 
 
New Zealand ranked highest amongst the 12 participating countries on this measure 
and also ranked highly on mean hours of study.  Participation was particularly high for 
those aged 16-25.49 
 
… but participation in formal education at ages 16-18 is comparatively low 
On the other hand, New Zealand ranks much lower on expected years of upper 
secondary education50 and on overall education participation in this age range.  Out of 
29 OECD countries, New Zealand ranked 11
th in expected years of upper secondary 
schooling, in 1998.  For education net enrolment rates (combining secondary, and 
post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary) at ages 16, 17 and 18, New Zealand ranked 
21
st out of 28, 24
th out of 28 and 22
nd out of 27, respectively (OECD, 2000a). 
 
Summary 
Taken together, this data does not suggest that New Zealand should be aiming, as a 
primary policy focus, to expand years of education in tertiary education, or to increase 
overall tertiary enrolment rates.  There may be some grounds for aiming to increase 
participation in the senior secondary school, or in equivalent education at the ages of 
16 through 18.  This is a policy that is likely both to increase average years of 
education in the working age population, and to raise achievement in the bottom 20% 
of the distribution of skills. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
population aged i at all ages.“  New Zealand’s high ranking may partly reflect unusually high entry rates at 
older ages. 
47 Tertiary-type A programmes are largely theory-based and designed to prepare students for advanced 
research programmes and highly qualified professions.  Programmes of Tertiary-type B are designed for 
direct entry into the labour market.  In New Zealand, every second young person is expected to enter 
Tertiary-type A education. 
48 This refers to the rate of graduation per population, and, for most countries, is calculated in a similar 
way to net entry rates (see footnote 46). 
49 Full-time students, not in the labour force, are excluded from this definition of participation in adult 
education and training. 
50 This data should be read in conjunction with expected years of tertiary education, where New Zealand 
ranks highly.  In some countries  (e.g. Sweden) upper secondary schooling is a substitute for tertiary 
education. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  29 
Quality of achievement 
On average, New Zealand students do very well in reading literacy, but rather less well 
in mathematics and science … 
In the two (1970 and 1990) International Educational Association surveys of reading 
literacy of school children, New Zealand ranked at or near the top (for 1990, see Elley, 
1992).  Given the fairly wide distribution of scores (see below) this implies that the 
better New Zealand students did particularly well.   
 
On the other hand, in two (1981 and 1994/95) surveys of mathematics and in one 
(1994/95) of science skills, New Zealand ranked amongst a middle group of countries 
for 13 & 14 year olds51.    For instance, in 1994/95 of 25 countries who fully met the 
survey requirements, New Zealand ranked 15
th for 14 year old mean scores. 
 
Mean mathematics achievement scores of 14 year olds in year eight of schooling  
1994 – 1995 – selected countries 
 
Australia52  530 
Canada 527 
England 506 
New Zealand  508 
Singapore 643 
United States  500 
 
Source: Beaton et al. (1996) 
 
…though by the final year of schooling the top 25% of New Zealanders are performing 
well in mathematics 
New Zealand performed better for students in the final year of schooling, ranking at 
fourth or fifth53.  In 1994 the top 25% of the cohort at the age of final year of schooling 
in New Zealand ranked third, after Sweden and Switzerland54. 
 
This suggests that New Zealand does not have a particular problem with quality of 
foundation literacy and mathematics skills in the top half of the distribution of skills.  
This conclusion is reinforced by the extent to which New Zealanders are able to access 
top ranking tertiary education institutions overseas. 
 
New Zealand’s performance in measures of adult literacy and numeracy is on average 
mediocre 
The International Adult Literacy Study, 1994/95, provides direct measures of skills in 
the working age populations in 12 participating countries.  The survey tested skills on 
three scales – “prose”, “document” and “quantitative”.  “Prose literacy” refers to the 
ability to understand and use information contained in various kinds of text.  “Document 
literacy” refers to the ability to locate and use information displayed in materials such 
                                                
51 In 1994, New Zealand ranked 25
th and 24
th out of 39 countries for mathematics achievement of 13 and 
14 year old students respectively.  Average scores were not statistically different to those in England, 
Scotland, the United States, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
52 Did not satisfy guidelines for sample participation rates. 
53 Mullis et al. (1998). 
54 Four east Asian countries which performed better than New Zealand at lower levels did not participate 
in the final year survey.  Nevertheless, in the final year survey New Zealand improved its ranking against a 
number of countries which participated in both.  The result for the top 25% of the cohort should remove 
any effects due to selection into the final year of schooling. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  30 
as schedules, charts, graphs, tables, maps and forms.  “Quantitative literacy” refers to 
the ability to extract numerical information from various sources, and to perform 
arithmetic operations to make use of it. 
 
Adult literacy is likely to reflect a number of factors, but particularly the quality of initial 
education; access to and quality of adult education and training; the skills of 
migrants55, and “learning by doing” on the job.   
 
Apart from the extremes of Sweden and Poland, mean scores across participating 
countries did not exhibit a wide range.  Of the 22 participating countries or regions, 
New Zealand did significantly better than 11 on the prose scale, six on the document 
scale, and five on the quantitative scale.  Conversely, it did significantly worse than four 
on the prose scale, 11 on the document scale, and 13 on the quantitative scale.  As 
noted in Part two, raising numeracy appears to have a strong effect on improving 
labour market outcomes at the bottom of the distribution. 
 
Mean adult literacy scores 1994-1995 – selected countries: 
 
 Prose  Document  Quantitative 
Australia 274.2  273.3  275.9 
Canada 278.8  279.3  281 
New Zealand  275.2  269.1  270.7 
Poland 229.5  223.9  234.9 
Sweden 301.3  305.6  305.9 
United Kingdom  266.7  267.5  267.2 
United States  273.7  267.9  275.2 
    
 
Source: (OECD & Statistics Canada, 1997& 2000) 
 
New Zealand produces engineering and science graduates at comparable rates to 
other English speaking OECD countries 
Part one discussed evidence that the production of engineering and science graduates 
may be particularly important for economic growth in OECD countries,56 and it is also 
commonly argued that New Zealand produces too few of such graduates.  However, 
New Zealand appears to have a comparatively high rate of production of graduates 
with first Tertiary-type A qualifications57 in engineering and science: 
 




New Zealand  6.3% 
United Kingdom  7.5% 
United States  4.3% 
 
Source: OECD (2000a) 
                                                
55 For two decades at least, the average educational attainments of adult migrants to New Zealand have 
been better than those of the native population (See Winkelmann 1999, Table 4). 
56 See for instance Ochoa (1994) and references in Romer (2000), Hanushek and Kimko (2000). 
57 Calculated from data in OECD (2000a).  Graduation rates are rates per relevant population and are 
calculated in a similar way to net enrolment rates (see footnote 46).  Note that several categories of 
degrees have been combined to reduce problems with different classifications across countries. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  31 
 
On the other hand, New Zealand has a relatively low rate of graduates from advanced 
research programmes (Ph.D or equivalent).  This may partly be due to students 
choosing to do advanced degrees overseas. 
 
This of course is a very crude measure of the relevance of tertiary education outputs to 
improving productivity and economic growth. 
 
More broadly, recent Treasury analysis58 suggests that there is little evidence in New 
Zealand of persistent, or consistent skill shortages.  Shortages mostly emerge during 
periods of expansion, and there is little evidence of firms’ productive capacity being 
harmed by shortages59.  Even in times of high relative shortages, the impact is not 
large.  However, better data and econometric analysis of the type represented in 
Nickell & Nicolitsas (1997) might reveal longer-term effects of persistent relative skill 
shortages in particular industries, on research and development and capital 
investments.  This is consistent with the mechanisms discussed in Part one. 
 
Finally, other evidence (from surveys of opinion) suggests that quality of managers, 
and management training is lower in New Zealand than in countries such as Australia, 
Canada, Finland and Ireland.  The same evidence also suggests that New Zealand 
rates poorly in “average number of years of schooling to support highly competitive 
industries” and the extent to which “staff training [is] heavily emphasized”, which is at 
odds with the evidence presented above from more objective sources.  It is not clear 
that comparisons across countries on these survey results represent objective 
differences60. 
 
Distribution of achievement in New Zealand 
On most measures, New Zealand has a comparatively wide dispersion of scores … 
While in international comparisons New Zealand ranks highly on some measures 
(literacy in schools) and amongst a middle group of countries on others, along with a 
group of mainly English speaking countries, it has a wider dispersion of achievement.  
This implies, for a given mean score, a longer tail of low achievers.  This is illustrated in 
the following data from the 1990 IEA Reading Literacy Study, particularly in the data for 
14 year olds.  Whereas New Zealand ranks highly for students at the 75
th percentile, 
and on mean scores, its ranking at the 25
th percentile is much lower61 – indicating a 
long tail of low achievers: 
 
                                                
58 Treasury (2001a). 
59 It is relevant to note that New Zealand has a net influx through migration of science and engineering 
professionals, averaging 5% of this workforce per annum (information supplied by the Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology).  There are issues of settlement and absorption into the workforce, that need to 
be taken into account. 
60 Evidence from the Global Competitiveness Report 1999, cited in IMF (2000).  IMF (2000) notes: 
“Survey data are necessarily subjective and especially in some areas, may be subject to large 
measurement errors which could, in turn, lead to a misleading picture of relativities across countries”. 
61In this study, New Zealand’s ranking for students whose home language was different to the school 
language was particularly poor – 21
st for both nine year olds and 14 year olds.  Elley (1992) notes that this 
largely reflects the performance of Pacific Island students. Other analysis (Grisay, 1995) shows that this 
relatively poor performance could not be explained by controlling for socioeconomic factors.  It should be 
noted however that there were differences across countries in the extent to which migrant children were 
included in the survey. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  32 
New Zealand’s rankings at the quartiles and on mean scores 
IEA 1990 Reading Literacy Study 
 
         
     25th  Mean  75
th 
   9 yr olds       
   (27 countries)       
   narrative  7  4 3 
   exposition  7  6 6 
   documents  7  8 5 
          
   14 yr olds     
   (31 countries)       
   narrative  11  5 1 
   exposition  15  8 3 
   documents  10  3 2 
              
 
Source Elley (1992) 
 
However, this pattern is not evident in the 1994–1995 third international mathematics 
study, where New Zealand’s rankings for 13 and 14 year old students was much the 
same (but middling amongst the 25 to 27 countries who fully met the survey 
requirements) at the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles.  Compared to the literacy study, 
reduced dispersion of scores in mathematics appears to be related to lower average 
scores62. 
 
Similarly, in the 1994-1995 International Adult Literacy Study (IALS), on each of the 
three scales, New Zealand ranks much the same at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles, and 
at the mean.  Nevertheless, along with Poland and some English speaking countries 
(the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Ireland), New Zealand has a 
relatively high dispersion of scores, as measured by the inter-quartile range63. 
 
The IALS scales are divided into five levels, with level one the lowest64.  Along with the 
United Kingdom, United States and Ireland, New Zealand has a larger share (around 
20%) of its working age population at the lowest level on all three scales than most of 
the other 13 participating countries.  Conversely, it has a relatively high share at levels 
4 and 5 on the prose and document scales, but not on the quantitative scale. 
 
… and appears to be falling further behind many other countries 
There is tendency in the IALS for younger cohorts to achieve higher average scores 
than older cohorts.  This is less marked for New Zealand (see table below).  
 
                                                
62 Dispersion of scores in this study, as measured by the inter-quartile range, appear to be correlated with 
mean scores.  Countries with high mean scores also tend to have high dispersion, while those with low 
scores have low dispersion.  With a middle range score, New Zealand also has a middle range dispersion 
of scores. 
63 Defined as the distance between scores at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles. 
64 Level 1 “indicates persons with very poor skills, where the individual may, for example, be unable to 
determine the correct amount of medicine to give a child from information on the package… Level 3 is 
considered a suitable minimum for coping with the demands of everyday life and work in a complex, 
advanced society”. (OECD & Statistics Canada, 2000). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  33 
% of population 16-25, and 46-55 at document literacy level 1 (the lowest) 1994-
1995 
 
  16-25 46-55 Difference 
Australia 9.7  23.6  13.9 
Canada  10.4 23.0 12.6 
New  Zealand  18.3 22.3 4.0 
Sweden  3.1 6.8 3.7 
United  Kingdom  17.8 24.5 6.7 
United  States  24.7 21.4 -3.3 
 
Source: (OECD & Statistics Canada, 1997) 
 
This suggests that New Zealand is not keeping up with improvements in other 
countries.  This may be associated with early school leaving and relatively low 
participation rates of 16, 17 and 18 year olds in education (see below)65.  The data 
thus suggests that the qualifications reform, and school retention policies of the 1990s 
have not made much difference to the bottom 15-20% of school leaving cohorts.  
 























Leavers with no quals Leavers in year turning 16




The evidence suggests that, compared to many other countries, there is considerable 
scope in New Zealand to improve skills in the bottom 20% of the distribution of skills, 
and that this will have beneficial effects on well-being, income dispersion, and, to some 
extent at least, on output per capita. 
                                                
65 It may also be connected to patterns of qualifications of school leavers.  However, here it should be 
noted that the two most common forms of qualifications for school leavers – the school certificate, and 
sixth form certificate – are essentially norm referenced, meaning that a proportion of each cohort is always 
going to not obtain them.  On the other hand, new forms of qualifications were introduced during the 1990s 
designed in part to make it easier for non-academic students to gain recognition of learning, and 
participation in the senior school increased sharply.   
66 “Early school leaving” is defined in terms of the numbers who have apparently left school in the year 
that they turn 16, and is constructed from age specific enrolment data in consecutive years.  In the early 
part of the period, a significant but decreasing group will have left in the year they turned 15.  Note that the 
data presented in this diagram does not adjust for business cycle effects on school leaving.  1991-96  was 
a period of rising labour demand. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  34 
 
The evidence does not suggest that New Zealand needs to expand tertiary education 
further, at least at a rapid rate.  To the extent that there are concerns about quality and 
fit with the demands of the economy, a range of policy approaches may be indicated.  
A key may be to use funding policy and institutional arrangements to ensure the 
development of a cadre of highly skilled individuals needed to adopt and implement 
promising new technologies. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  35 
 
Comparison with Australia highlights areas where New Zealand lags 
 
Given a degree of similarity in educational and cultural history, it is informative to compare 
New Zealand directly with Australia on the above measures: 
 
Measure    Australia  New Zealand 
Ave. yrs of ed. in 
working age pop. 
1998 
 12.3  11.8 
Expected yrs 
tertiary ed, 17 yr 
olds, 1997 
 3.7  3.1 
Tertiary net entry 
rates67 1998 
Tertiary-type A  53%  68% 
 Tertiary-type  B  missing  36% 
Participation rate 
in adult education 
& training 1994-
95 
 38.8%  47.5% 
1998 education 
enrolment rates at 
age 
16 yrs  97%  88% 
 17  yrs  91%  72% 




14 yr olds   530  508 
  Final yr of school  525  525 
  Top 25% of final yr 
age cohort 
620 621 
Ave. IALS scores 
1994-95 
Prose 274.2  275.2 
 Document  273.3  269.1 
 Quantitative  275.9  270.7 
IALS inter-quartile 
range 
Prose 69.9  74.6 
 Document  68.2  78.2 
 Quantitative 70.6  76.1 
% of population at 
document literacy 
level 1 
Aged 16-25  9.7%  18.3% 
 Aged  46-55  23.6%  22.3% 
 
 
In summary, the data suggests that Australia and New Zealand have similar average 
levels of achievement with New Zealand having a somewhat greater dispersion of 
                                                
67 See footnote 46.  The figure is an entry rate for a “synthetic cohort” based on current patterns of entry, 
and designed to allow comparison across countries.  Actual entry rates for particular cohorts will be much 
lower. 
68 For the final year study, Australia excluded 5.5% of the sample, while New Zealand excluded none.  
However, this difference does not affect the measure for the top 25% of the cohort.  At the 14-year-old 
level, Australia achieved much lower sample participation rates, which needs to be taken into account in 
comparing average scores. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  36 
scores in the adult measures.  There is some suggestion that New Zealand is falling 
behind in skills at the bottom of the distribution over time.   
 
New Zealand has higher tertiary entry rates, but it appears that Australians who 
undertake tertiary education do so for a somewhat longer period of time.  On the other 
hand, working age New Zealanders are more likely to be participating in other forms of 
adult education and training.  The most marked participation differences are in 
education enrolments across the ages 16 through 18, where Australia has considerably 
higher rates than New Zealand.  Overall on average, Australia’s working age 
population has more years of education than does New Zealand’s. 
 
Of all the English-speaking countries in the OECD, Australia has patterns of education 
participation, attainment and achievement that are most like those of the Scandinavian 
and other European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
 
What accounts for these different patterns?  One possibility is differences in the 
occupational and industrial composition of the economy, creating different demands for 
skills in the workplace, and different opportunities to acquire them.  IALS data shows 
that in 1994-95 44% of the New Zealand and 39% of the Australian labour force were 
employed in jobs classified as low skilled.  On the other hand, skills used in the 
workplace are likely, to some extent, to reflect the supply of skills in the labour force. 
 
Another possibility is that skills held by older generations differ, and this is reflected in 
the skills acquired in the younger generation.  However, the IALS data suggests that 
the skill profiles of the 46-55 year old cohort in New Zealand and Australia are much 
more similar than the profiles for the 16-25 year old cohort.  Other possible 
explanations include differences in education systems (a much larger proportion of 
primary and secondary education is privately provided in Australia, for instance), and 
relatedly, differences in government policies towards education (higher rates of 
economic growth in Australia allows higher per student expenditures, for instance; 
Australia introduced a vigorous range of policies to promote participation in post-
compulsory secondary and vocational education in the early 1990s). HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  37 
 
PART SIX  OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE WELL-BEING THROUGH 
HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Raising skills in the bottom of the distribution of skills provides the greatest opportunity 
to improve well-being in New Zealand 
The argument in Parts one to five lead to the conclusion that the greatest opportunity 
for improving well-being in New Zealand, using human capital policies, is to focus on 
raising achievement in the bottom of the distribution of skills – particularly the bottom 
quintile. 
 
Early interventions are the most cost-effective in the long run 
There are two issues here – how to reduce the numbers of young people leaving 
education without adequate skills to secure stable employment, and how to improve 
skills for those already in the workforce.  Because of the cumulative nature of 
educational investments, early interventions in pre-school and primary education are 
likely to be most cost-effective in the long run. 
 
The period from birth (even pre-birth) to school age is a critical development phase with 
life-long effects on well-being.  Intensive early childhood interventions can be effective 
in improving a range of both short and long term outcomes for disadvantaged 
children69.  However, such interventions are relatively expensive (compared to regular 
early childhood education), targeting instruments are not perfect, and it may be difficult 
to engage the most disadvantaged families.  Therefore interventions need to be 
carefully designed in terms of the age of the child, their targeting on risk factors and 
their mix of child-focussed and parent-focussed elements.  Intensive very early 
interventions for children most at risk may be important, given rapid brain development 
that takes place in these years.   
 
Good quality standard early childhood education also appears to have a beneficial 
effect, in particular for disadvantaged children, but again it is difficult to ensure that the 
most disadvantaged children access provision.  In addition, there is evidence that some 
of the benefits of pre-school interventions – particularly higher cognitive skills – are lost, 
if primary education is of insufficient quality70. Primary schooling is thus of key 
importance in addressing the risk of low achievement.  
 
Of particular importance are foundation skills in literacy and numeracy that provide the 
platform for later learning both in school and the workforce.  Such skills have been 
shown to have a strong link with labour market success independent of levels of 
education (OECD and Statistics Canada 1997; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Maré and 
Chapple, 2000 for New Zealand).   
 
Basic literacy and numeracy are particularly important … 
Recent research in the United Kingdom (Machin et al. 2001) suggests that raising 
numeracy skills is particularly important for improving labour market outcomes for those 
in the lower part of the distribution of skills (while improving literacy has a stronger 
effect for those who are already well skilled).  The research also suggests that basic 
literacy and numeracy have a more important and more robust effect than a range of 
other “soft skills” and attitudes on labour market outcomes.   
 
                                                
69 See, for instance, Waldfogel, (1999). 
70 See Nechyba et al. (1999).  HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  38 
… as recognised in many jurisdictions 
Many jurisdictions – for example the United Kingdom, and many states in the United 
States, have put increasing emphasis on the acquisition of such skills during 
elementary schooling – for instance, by putting in place standardised measurement of 
progress, at individual, school and national level.   
 
 
  Improving literacy and numeracy in the United Kingdom 
 
Over the 1990s successive British governments first instituted national tests of 
literacy and numeracy at ages seven, 11 and 14, and, under the current 
government, mandatory literacy and numeracy hours, together with national 
targets for the percentage of 11 year-olds passing the 11 year-old norm in 2002.  
The following table shows that these measures have been highly successful in 
increasing the percentage of 11 year-olds passing the norms.  The ambitious 
targets for 2002 are likely easily to be met.  Currently, attention is being focused 









1996 57  54 
1997 63  62 
1998 65  59 
1999 71  69 
2000 75  72 





Source: Layard et al. (2000) 
 
 
A range of interventions may be effective.  By and large, they will need to pay 
particular attention to local design and adaptation of policy.  In particular, they will 
need to find ways to engage families and communities in pursuing meaningful 
objectives for their children, recognising the important contribution that each makes 
to children’s outcomes.  The Strengthening Education in Mangere and Otara (SEMO) 
initiative is a promising recent New Zealand example of such an approach.  A key 
issue is how to generalise such an approach to other disadvantaged communities, 
given scarcity of skilled human resources, and the costs involved.   HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  39 
 
Strengthening education in South Auckland 
 
The Strengthening Education in Mangere and Otara (SEMO) initiative commenced in 
1997 in response to an Education Review Office (ERO) report criticising the quality of 
education in many South Auckland schools.  It aims to strengthen schools in Mangere 
and Otara by improving their capacity to manage themselves.  The Ministry of Education 
provides extra assistance to this end. 
 
SEMO’s design reflected recent research on school improvement that emphasised the 
importance for sustained gains of involving both schools and community groups.   
Relevant resources (aspirations for children, understanding of what is needed to reach 
them and the skills to do so), are more likely to be identified and aligned through such an 
approach.  The initiative worked within national education policy parameters, and the 
culture, politics and recent educational history of Mangere and Otara.  It thus aimed to be 
a partnership between the state and the local communities, families and schools. 
 
Evaluation (Robinson et. al., 2000) shows that considerable obstacles (the historical 
pattern of relationships and expectations, suspicion of state interventions, expectations of 
management autonomy, community loss of confidence in the local schools) stood in the 
path of achieving partnership.    Over time, through learning from the feedback of the 
various communities, schools, and evaluators many of these obstacles have been 
overcome, resulting in the establishment of effective partnerships.   
 
The evaluators note the importance of SEMO activities (which are complex and diverse) 
focusing on the central objective of sustainable improvement in students’ achievement.  
Activities not so focused can “wittingly or unwittingly divert the attention and effort that is 
needed to achieve this goal”.  SEMO has been successful in gaining community and 
schools support for this goal. 
 
A current activity in 13 schools is a programme of teacher professional development on 
the analysis and use of student achievement data.  Already, an evaluation of another 
component of SEMO, a teacher development programme focused on early years of 
schooling, indicates that it is substantially improving the chances of children from low-
income families reaching national standards of literacy achievement71. 
 
 
More generally, there is a long-standing debate in the empirical literature about how far 
schools’ resourcing levels are important for improving achievement outcomes.  A wide 
range of studies fails to find any consistent relationship between resources and 
outcomes.  However, recent evidence from experimental use of smaller class sizes and 
more careful use of other data has begun to uncover the relationships expected72.  
The evidence suggests that persistent reductions in class-size are an effective means 
to improve achievement and later employment outcomes for disadvantaged children, 
particularly in the earlier years of schooling.  However, whether or not this is the most 
cost-effective means requires further investigation.  Certainly, the consensus is that 
any such policy needs to be accompanied by other measures to maximise the gains. 
 
Evidence on effective programmes to raise basic skills amongst adults is weak 
Addressing low levels of human capital in the adult population raises different issues.  
First evidence suggests that  pre-employment labour market and basic skills training is 
not very effective in securing better labour market and earnings outcomes for low 
                                                
71 Personal communication from Ministry of Education, including preliminary data from an evaluation. 
72 Grissmer et al. (2000), Krueger & Whitmore (2000) and Boozer & Maloney (2001).  The last study is 
based on data from the Christchurch Health and Development Survey. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  40 
skilled adults73.  In the short to medium term, evidence supports concentrating on 
getting persistently unemployed persons into work as a first priority.  On the other 
hand, policies that concentrate on human capital accumulation may eventually match 
“work first” policies in effectiveness (though not cost-effectiveness), over the longer 
term (see Hotz et al, 2000).  In addition human capital policies appear to have 
important benefits both for individuals and their families, other than improving labour 
market outcomes74.  These need to be taken into account, to the extent that the 
evidence on causal effects is strong.  
 
There may also be a role for improving the quality and quantity of training available in 
employment for the low skilled (Acemoglu 2001a)75.  As is currently the policy in New 
Zealand, government financial support for and certification of employer based training 
may assist.  As noted above, New Zealand already has high rates of participation in 
adult education and training.  Unfortunately those who reach working age with low skills 
are the least likely to be employed, and if employed, to receive training (OECD and 
Statistics Canada, 1997).  It may be possible to bundle support for employment-based 
training with other policies aimed to assist the low skilled into work. 
 
More generally, it should be recognised that people in the bottom 20% of the 
distribution of skills vary widely in the characteristics that are associated with their low 
skills.  Some will not be able to benefit from human capital policies in terms of improved 
labour market attachment76, but may nevertheless benefit for other reasons. 
 
Overall, there is a need to get a better understanding of what policies are effective for 
the adult population, in which circumstances and for whom.  This can only be achieved 
through experimentation and good evaluation of policies as they are implemented in 
New Zealand, and drawing on learning from other jurisdictions.  It also requires a better 
understanding of the characteristics of people who have persistent difficulties in 
securing stable employment. 
 
There is an important ethnic dimension to raising skills  
Maori and Pacific peoples are over-represented among the low skilled.  This poses an 
important challenge to a well-functioning society, particularly to the extent that it is seen 
to have resulted from unfair processes in the past and present.  Cultural and historical 
factors have important implications for the design of interventions to raise human 
capital among Maori and Pacific peoples. 
 
These issues are canvassed in the Treasury report “Closing the Gaps Framework” 
completed in 2000. 
 
                                                
73 Heckman (1999) provides a useful summary of the evidence on this point.  Numerous other studies 
show similar results.  A recent U.K. study (Brooks et al, 2001) finds that, though potentially important in 
improving outcomes, “there is an absence of intervention studies exploring what factors in teaching basic 
skills cause progress in learning basic skills”. 
74 Johnson (2000) describes a “relatively new” approach in the U.K. and the U.S. which bundles 
programmes for children and adults into “Family Literacy”.  Research shows that adults in such 
programmes stay enrolled for longer than in most adult-only programmes, and had better learning gains.  
Children also made achievement gains.  See also Brooks et al. (2001). 
75 Johnson (2000) cites Australian and U.S. research showing the benefits of workplace literacy 
programmes for both employees and employers.  In general however, there is a dearth of reliable data on 
or evaluation of the longer run effects of such programmes on productivity (and earnings).  
76 Evidence from the United States suggests that even with a buoyant economy, people with very low 
cognitive skills, or problems with mental health or substance abuse, will still find it difficult to secure stable 
employment.  A different set of policies is required to prevent or ameliorate the effects of these factors on 
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New Zealand can benefit from policies that improve the quality and relevance of 
selected areas of tertiary education 
The other issue that stands out is whether human capital policies can be better 
designed to support the processes of technology adoption that underlie economic 
growth.  As noted above, this first requires leading-edge technical, managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills to identify and adapt new technologies to production.  Given that 
most new technologies will be created abroad, leading-edge experts need to build and 
maintain good linkages internationally – as well as with local industry.  Technological 
progress also requires a workforce with good general skills to operate new “skill-
biased” technologies. 
 
The literature suggests that a key issue is providing a policy environment that 
encourages students, tertiary education providers and industries to make 
complementary investments. 
 
New Zealand has high rates of participation in tertiary education… 
New Zealand has been remarkably successful in rapidly increasing output of tertiary 
graduates over the last 15 years77, while keeping real government outlays tightly 
constrained.  This has been achieved through bulk funding tertiary institutions on the 
basis of student numbers, with students expected to contribute a part of tuition costs 
(able to be financed through student loans).  This bulk funding includes an element to 
cover research – but does not provide strong incentives for excellence in research. 
 
Quality assurance systems are designed to ensure tertiary providers exceed minimum 
standards.  The main mechanism to achieve responsiveness of provision to the needs 
of the economy is student demand for courses, which in turn is postulated to depend 
on differences in labour market returns to educational investments.  Certainly high 
private rates of return to tertiary education appear to have been a significant driver of 
increased participation in New Zealand. 
 
…but competes in an international labour market for the most skilled academic workers 
However, New Zealand is a small, remote, open economy that operates in an 
international labour market for the most skilled workers.  It is competing with a number 
of higher income countries for the best academic workers.  It is very unlikely that 
policies that aim at a uniform standard across the system, will reliably produce world 
class centres of research and teaching – no country has the resources to afford a 
uniformly world class standard of provision in its universities.  
 
Careful funding and institutional design is required to increase the incidence of world 
class tertiary research and teaching in an affordable way 
While some recognised centres of excellence do exist, it is possible that a careful 
choice of funding and institutional arrangements could lead to the emergence of more, 
in areas of particular relevance to economic growth.   Encouraging selected areas of 
world-class provision requires internationally competitive salaries.  Building on 
emerging centres of excellence, particularly where they can demonstrate effective 
linkages with relevant industries, and with overseas centres, could reduce the risk of 
wasted resources78.  Internationally, it is not uncommon for research centres (often 
                                                
77 Numbers of students graduating with bachelors degrees increased by 260% between 1990 and 1999, 
and numbers with post-graduate degrees by almost 300% (information supplied by the Ministry of 
Education). 
78 The importance of “close and synergistic links”, and cost sharing arrangements between government 
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associated with teaching) to be funded through a tendering process which provides 
sufficient continuity to allow strategic investments to be made, but which also provides 
strong incentives for performance. 
 
New Zealand can support only a limited number of such centres – but they could play a 
significant role in the identification and adoption of new technologies (and, in some 
areas, the creation of new technologies) by attracting and retaining top staff and 
students, and building linkages with industry across which knowledge can be 
transferred79.  The particular design of institutions and funding arrangements are likely 
be important for giving industry, students and tertiary managers the confidence to make 
the investments that will yield productivity gains in the longer term.  A degree of 
experimentation may be required to find the best policies. 
 
Summary 
Policies to raise tertiary performance do not require large amounts of extra government 
resources 
Policies aiming to increase the incidence of world-class tertiary education and research 
relevant to industry do not require large additions to existing publicly provided 
resources.    This will involve only a small proportion of all tertiary provision, and high 
private rates of return provide strong incentives for individual students to contribute 
their own resources (assisted by the student loan scheme).  More selective funding, 
coupled with suitable institutional arrangements could lead to significant 
improvements80. 
 
… raising skills at the bottom may require more, but the potential benefits are large 
On the other hand, determined efforts to reduce the incidence of low skills among new 
entrants to the working age population are likely to require significant additional 
resources – but again careful work is required to identify the most cost-effective 
policies.  Much less is known about the capacity to raise basic skills in the adult 
population – suggesting a cautious approach, with expansion dependent on successful 
evaluation.  Recent work in the United Kingdom (Bynner et al., 2001) suggests that if 
successful in raising skills, such initiatives could have substantial benefits not only for 
the individuals concerned, but also for social outcomes, productivity, economic growth 
and fiscally. 
                                                
79 For instance, Adams et al. (2000) report evidence that Industry-University Cooperative Research 
Centers (IURCs) in the U.S. promote technology transfer.  IURCs are small academic centres that depend 
mostly on industry support. 
80 This argument is reinforced by the fact that New Zealand’s ratio of per student expenditure in tertiary 
education to that in primary (or secondary) is comparatively high among OECD countries (see footnote 3).  HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY  43 
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APPENDIX 
Comment on issues in the interpretation of empirical evidence on human capital 
Cross-country growth regressions 
Brock and Durlauf (2000) raise three main “questions” about current empirical practice 
in the study of the determinants of growth.  These are relevant to deciding how much 
weight to place on the available evidence – particularly that presented in OECD 
(2000b). 
 
Model uncertainty due to theory uncertainty 
Cross-country growth regressions are limited by data availability and low degrees of 
freedom in the variables that can be included.  Due to multicollinearity and missing 
variable bias, estimated co-efficients can vary widely in different specifications.  Growth 
theory is “open ended” as to which variables should be included81.  Brock & Durlauf 
consider that previous strategies (e.g. extreme bounds analysis) to address model 
uncertainty are insufficiently systematic, (and in some respects misguided), to yield 
useful predictions for policy purposes82.  
 
The most recent OECD study (OECD, 2000a) appears to take considerable care in 
testing the robustness of the co-efficient estimates across a range of different 
specifications, including: introduction of country-specific time dummies; sample 
variations across countries and over time; estimation of standard cross-country 
regressions and panel data regressions based on five-year averages; identification of 
and controls for outliers; exclusion and inclusion of various countries.  However only a 
limited range of variables (guided by theoretical considerations about their influence on 
growth) are included in alternative specifications.  The order of magnitude of the co-
efficient on human capital is robust to all these specifications.  
 
Nevertheless, the study probably falls considerably short of the sort of policy focused 
systematic testing and summarising of the results of alternative models recommended 
by Brock and Durlauf.  The OECD (2000a) authors themselves note that the human 
capital variable may be picking up the effects of omitted variables. 
 
Model uncertainty due to heterogeneity uncertainty 
According to Brock and Durlauf (2000): “The vast majority of empirical growth studies 
assume that the parameters which describe growth are identical across countries… the 
assumption of parameter homogeneity seems particularly inappropriate when one is 
studying complex heterogeneous objects such as countries”.  Moreover, a number of 
studies have shown this assumption to be incorrect. 
 
OECD (2000b) addresses this issue reasonably well, in two ways: 
•  The sample is restricted to a number of countries where an assumption of 
homogeneity is more plausible.   
                                                
81 “…one finds that well over 90 variables have been proposed as potential growth determinants … each 
one of which has some ex ante plausibility”. 
82 Brock & Durlauf go on to recommend a policy-relevant econometrics which explicitly identifies the 
objectives of the policy maker, and then calculates the expected consequences of a policy change.  In 
practice this involves systematically testing, summarising through “model averaging” and evaluating the 
results from a range of specifications which include the policy relevant variable and accounts for model 
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•  The assumption of homogeneity across countries is limited to a small number of 
variables that are, on theoretical grounds, believed to influence the long-run 
steady state output path.  The assumption is tested in the data.  
 
Direction of causality 
Brock and Durlauf (2000) note: “Many of the standard variables which are used to 
explain growth patterns – democracy, trade openness, rule of law, social capital, etc. 
are as much outcomes of socioeconomic relationships as growth itself”.  Hence simple 
regressions should not be interpreted as structural.  Even the use of instrumental 
variables is likely to be flawed, given model uncertainty (it is difficult to eliminate the 
possibility that an instrumental variable is correlated with omitted growth factors in the 
regression). 
 
Commenting on a similar study to OECD (2000b), de la Fuente83 argues that this is 
less likely to be an issue where human capital is measured as a stock rather than 
through enrolment rates – because the stock changes only slowly over time.   This 
argument is not conclusive, because investment rates may be correlated with 
(anticipated) growth rates – faster growing countries may invest more resources in 
increasing the stock of human capital – and it is variation in the latter across countries 
and across time that is identifying effects in the regression analysis in OECD (2000b).  
For instance, a recent study, Bils and Klenow (2000), concludes that much of the 
association runs from growth to schooling. 
 
Measurement error 
Recent studies (e.g. Krueger and Lindahl, 2000; de la Fuente and Domenech, 2000) 
show that earlier work on the relationship between the stock of human capital and 
economic growth was subject to significant measurement error in the human capital 
variable.  This appears to explain the failure of many earlier studies to find a significant 
relationship, particularly when change in the human capital stock was used as the 
dependent variable (thus magnifying the effect of mis-measurement).  OECD (2000b) 
uses a much-improved dataset constructed by de la Fuente and Domenech for OECD 
countries, and this undoubtedly contributes to the much stronger relationship found. 
 
On the other hand, as David (2001) points out, even the best measurement of average 
years of schooling remains a very crude proxy for the diverse theoretically relevant 
concepts of human capital.  Relevant dimensions not captured include the quality of 
education (in some studies proxied by results in internationally comparable 
achievement tests; in others, by resource inputs), and how education is distributed 
among the employed workforce, as opposed to the working age population.  Other 
models (see Romer, 2000) suggest that it is the numbers of scientists and engineers 




As Temple (2000) notes: “The evidence that earnings are positively associated with 
schooling is robust and uncontroversial; the obvious difficulty lies in giving this 
association a causal interpretation”. 
An important empirical problem is the omission (through lack of data) of variables that 
are correlated with both schooling and earnings – such as family background, and 
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ability.  If more able individuals have higher earnings regardless of education, then the 
effects of education on productivity are likely to be overstated.  Another related problem 
is that the costs and benefits of education are likely to differ across individuals, and 
may be thus correlated with the explanatory variables (such as years of schooling), 
thus also leading to biased estimates. 
 
Econometricians have attempted to overcome these problems using a range of 
techniques.  They have mainly used situations – so-called “natural experiments” – 
where variations in schooling occur for reasons likely to be independent of the 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. ability) of the individuals studied.  These techniques 
tend to find that labour market returns to schooling are similar to those found in 
conventional studies. 
 
Nevertheless, even these studies are not conclusive.  A further set of models suggest 
reasons why earnings may be correlated with schooling even if schooling has no effect 
on productivity.  High-ability individuals, who find schooling less difficult, may stay in 
school for longer because this decision signals their ability to employers. The results 
from “natural experiment” studies can be interpreted in a way consistent with these 
studies.   
 
Signalling models predict that the social returns to education (in terms of earnings) will 
be lower than the private returns.  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use historical 
variations in compulsory schooling laws across states in the United States as a way to 
test this, and find that social and private returns to additional years of schooling are 
very similar.  Acemoglu (2001b) concludes from this that signalling effects are likely to 
be weak (at least at this level of schooling)84. 
 
More generally, the problems in inferring a causal relationship between education and 
labour earnings are likely to apply a fortiori to the relationship with other outcomes that 
influence or constitute well-being.  Available data sets and research effort focussed on 
these issues are many times weaker than in the case of education and earnings. 
 
Similar issues apply in understanding the determinants of educational achievement and 
attainment85.  Consequently, considerable care is needed in interpreting the empirical 
evidence to select suitable human capital policies to improve outcomes.  Uncertainties 
in the evidence need to be identified, and factored into policy design, taking account of 
the risks inherent in the nature of the proposed policy.  Experimental design and 
evaluation may sometimes be the best means to provide sufficient confidence to justify 
large-scale implementation of new policies. 
                                                
84 Acemoglu and Angrist interpret their results as showing that positive productive externalities to 
schooling are also weak.  To the extent that differences in compulsory schooling laws reflect differences in 
the demand for child labour, and these differences reflect labour market conditions that persist into the 
future, the results of this study are open to other interpretations. 
85 Nechyba et al. (1999) provide a very clear account of these issues. 